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 Elected representatives, like consumers, want reliable good quality 
medical services. Pharmacy services are no exception. Providing sound 
advice on which drug to take for a minor ailment, or the common side 
effects of a drug or keeping careful track of a consumer’s drug regimen, 
promote good health outcomes.   
 
Government in 1996 introduced two inter-related policies designed to raise 
the quality of pharmacy services in Ireland.    
  
• First, the Health (Community Pharmacy Contract Agreement) 
Regulations, 1996. The 1996 Pharmacy Regulations confined the 
opening of new pharmacies to instances where there was a ‘definite 
public health need.’ Minimum distances were specified between 
pharmacies. New pharmacies could not threaten the viability of an 
existing pharmacy.1  
• Second, the 1996 Community Pharmacy Contract, between an 
individual pharmacy and a Health Board, specified that pharmacists 
were to provide certain services drawing on their professional 
knowledge and expertise. These included checking the drug 
regimen of a consumer, including the examination of the rational 
and cost effective use of medicines.    
Government funded community drug schemes account for the vast 
majority of drugs dispensed. 
 
 
∗ paul.gorecki@esri.ie 
1 These regulations were unexpectedly revoked in January 2002 following legal action. 
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These two policies appear, however, to have had little effect on the quality 
of pharmacy services, while having some undesirable side effects: 
 
• The 1996 Pharmacy Regulations led to a drastic decline in the 
opening of new pharmacies, despite a large increase in demand, 
with the result that the value of pharmacies was inflated 
considerably – by between 40 per cent and 60 per cent. There is 
little evidence that these restrictions on entry led to any 
improvement in service quality – casting doubt on the purported 
rationale for the policy. If pharmacists, as private parties, has agreed 
collectively to these regulations they would almost certainly have 
been guilty of a breach of Section 4(1) of the Competition Act, 
which prohibits anti-competitive agreements. 
• The 1996 Community Pharmacy Contract provisions relating to 
improved pharmacy services for consumers are aspirational. The 
provisions are largely unenforceable; do not recognise the 
conflicting motivations of a pharmacist and result in no measurable 
output.   
Five lessons are presented so as to inform future community pharmacy 
contracts so as to better realise any desired improvements in service quality. 
 
Lesson #1: Avoid Regulatory Capture – Government intervention 
should promote consumer welfare and be consistent with the better 
regulation agenda, rather than, as appears to be the case here, primarily 
benefiting the producer – incumbent pharmacies.   
 
Lesson #2: A Valid Rationale? – Regulatory intervention requires a valid 
rationale such as market power, externalities or information asymmetries 
that is consistent with the facts.  The rationale for restricting the opening 
new pharmacies was “over competition.”  The evidence suggested no such 
state of affairs; if anything the pharmacy market had many of the hall 
marks of a protected less than competitive market that required more 
competition and more not less entry.   
 
Lesson #3: Contracts Should be S.M.A.R.T. – A contract between a 
purchaser, such as the health board, and provider, such as a pharmacy, 
should be well specified.  They should be SMART – Specific; Measurable; 
Attainable; Realistic; and Timely – rather than aspirational. 
 
Lesson #4: Incentives Count, So Don’t Ignore Them – Regulatory 
regimes or contracts for services should ensure that these are incentive 
compatible with the motivation of the provider. If pharmacists are 
compensated on the basis of a mark-up on the cost of a drug then they will 
have an incentive to dispense a high priced brand. Expecting the 
pharmacist to spend time persuading the physician to prescribe a lower 
priced brand, since the pharmacist is not able to dispense a lower priced 
brand without permission, is thus doubly unlikely – a loss in income from 
dispensing a lower priced brand and the time taken to persuade the 
prescriber.   
 
Lesson #5: Markets Do Work: Working with Rather than Against the 
Market – New entrants typically supply new ideas, new ways of doing 
things, with the result that productivity and innovation increase.  
Competitive markets are able to provide improved services in terms of 
prices and other non-price aspects that are valued by consumers, such as 
opening hours, home delivery and so on.   
 
It could, of course, be argued that these lessons are of historical interest 
only. In fact, they are still highly relevant, as evidenced by the statement as 
of 2009 from the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland, the pharmacists’ 
regulatory body: “[A] model based on the ‘free market’ should be 
discouraged and instead the normative need of the patients and population 
should be the driving forces behind a new generation of pharmacy services. 
Restrictions on new pharmacy openings should be considered and a 
methodology that optimises fair access for patients and ensures pharmacies 
are located where need is identified, should be developed.”  
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